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Abstract: This article aims at giving an overview the 
current status and potential perspectives, including 
the open points,  for space applications of the 
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) concept defined 
and developed by the aeronautic industry. 
At first, a status will be made on the current of the 
on-board data-handling system for the space 
applications, in particular the way CNES pushed the 
concept of platform and the way it has been spread 
by industry for non-CNES programs (under ESA 
contract, commercial market, international 
cooperation) : from SPOT earth observation to 
telecom satellites including scientific missions based 
on PROTEUS and MYRIADE platforms will be 
described. 
Then it will demonstrated to which extend the IMA 
concept is not yet directly applicable in the context of 
the space domain : technical (constraints/limitations 
on rad-hard processors, limited volume of embedded 
applications, mission-criticality of all on-board 
applications…), organisational constraints (ESA, 
national agencies and the various industry actors) 
and specific other space domain (market and 
associated investment budgets) will be detailed. 
 
In the last part, it will presented how and which of the 
concepts inherited from IMA are however considered 
relevant for space. In particular the various technical 
fields have been explored and will be presented in 
various area such as ARINC 653 standards (system 
partitioning and segregation), software 
standardisation of architectures and associated 
building blocks (isolation of applications and 
independent development and validation), 
engineering methods, associated tools. The 
organisational problems and associated business 
model will also be considered (need for architecture 
and design authority funding the investment, 
responsible for technical requirements and 
maintenance).  
Preliminary studies and a roundtable have been held 
within the space domain and a work plan established 
in order to gain from the IMA experience and fill the 
technology gaps. However the lack of visibility on the 
real issues behind the IMA and still missing answers 
to some questions (lessons learnt from aeronautic 
world are partly hidden from the external) are 
dramatically decreasing the spin-in process 
efficiency…. 
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1. Introduction 
The IMA concept has been created and deployed in 
the aeronautic domain in order to optimise the 
development and validation effort of the on-board 
functions by offering a common standard core (made 
of on-board computer hardware -CPIOM-, bus -
AFDX- and on-board software middleware including 
ARINC 653 compliant operating system and 
standard APIs). 
Space domain agencies and industry are facing the 
same constraints and needs as the aeronautic ones 
in particular in terms of : 
• Cost and efficiency optimisation, 
• Schedule reduction, 
• Increasing on-board complexity and autonomy, 
• Evolution and concentration of organisations, 
• Reliability and criticality. 
There is a need for changing the way (technical and 
organisational) to design and develop satellites and 
space systems : standardisation is a key issue 
already identified ten years ago. 
2. Standardisation tentative 
2.1 Concept of platform 
In order to standardise or at least develop once 
common avionics for several missions, in the 
eighties, appeared the concept of satellite platforms : 
the idea consisted in physical and functional 
decoupling of the basic avionics and housekeeping 
functions (power, AOCS, thermal, TM/TC) 
constituting the platform from the mission functions 
(payload instruments). This concept enabled already 
mutualisation of engineering, design and validation 
effort between several mission of the same types : 
• SPOT family of satellite, under ASTRIUM prime 
contract was based on an ASTRIUM/CNES 
MARKII platform concept declined into SPOT1, 
2, 3, ERS 1, 2. MARKIII (MARKII follow-on) 
supported SPOT4, ENVISAT, SPOT5, METOP 
missions (and their military cousins HELIOS1 
and 2). 
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• PROTEUS platform was designed and 
developed by CNES/TAS and supports various 
scientific missions such as JASON1, 2, 
CALIPSO, COROT. 
• For the telecom satellites, both ASTRIUM 
(EUROSTAR 2000/3000) and TAS (AVIONICS 
4000) invested on their own on full reusable 
platforms declined easily, faster and cheaper for 
the needs of the commercial telecom operators. 
A common initiative funded by ESA and CNES, 
ALPHABUS, currently under development has 
been invested on what will be  the future telecom 
platforms for both prime contractors extending 
the concept of platform to some kind of common 
standard avionics building blocks. 
• For cheap and less stringent missions, CNES 
has invested in the late nineties into a small 
micro-satellite platform, MYRIADE, and already 
various missions have been developed and 
launched (DEMETER, PARASOL, …), some are 
still under development (PICARD, TARANIS). 
The concept has been made available to the 
prime contractors for their own applications (e.g. 
ASTRIUM has based the ALSAT satellite on this 
platform for a commercial earth observation 
export program). This concept has been 
considered also very attractive for military cheap 
missions. 
The lessons learnt from those platforms investments 
show a real and effective cost reduction. However, 
and except in the telecom world, the number of 
missions for each platform remains very low (up to 
10-15 at most).  
 
2.2 Satellite avionics architecture and platform 
concept limitations 
Despite the real gains obtained thanks to platforms, 
a survey shows that 80% non-recurring costs of the 
satellites are mission dependant and not only on 
instruments/payloads. This means that for each 
mission the impact of the specific requirements on 
the platform are quite high, in particular in the 
software development and validation. 
The reasons for such major impact of each mission 
on the platform design are partly hidden and industry 
confidential. This is due mainly to the competition 
between prime contractors, but also to the customer-
supplier relationship between agencies and primes. 
It is therefore very difficult to access the real internal 
cost data. Out of the in-house CNES experience 
gained on MYRIADE, but also to the PROTEUS 
CNES funded platform, it was made possible to 
outline a first list of those reasons. 
The platform was supposed to implement all and 
only generic and standard features. However : 
• There is a strong coupling between the mission 
and the platform : the performance of the final 
system links the instrument capabilities with the 
platform ones (e.g in earth observation and most 
scientific mission satellite pointing is directly 
defining the mission performances), 
• The interfaces (space to ground protocols, 
operations) are specific to the final customer 
(ESA, CNES, commercial export…),  
• Some constraints are also coming from the 
launcher leading to satellite/platform design 
impacts, 
• There is a strong dependency between 
hardware and software (processors, I/O 
management, on-board protocols). 
Obsolescence of components is very difficult to 
master from the software side (e.g. on 
MYRIADE platform migration from T805 
processor to ERC32/LEON imply a major 
software redesign). 
• The processor resources are very limited 
(European rad-hard product lines : ERC32 offers 
only up to 20 MIPS). This leads to software 
optimisation, degrading the reusability 
(modularity, parameterised functions, ...), 
• The reliability has to be kept very high and the 
projects prefer to run a complete software 
validation and qualification for their mission 
rather than relying on a generic validation  
performed once. 
All those aspects lead for each mission to major 
consequences on the platform software, and very 
often a complete redesign and qualification are 
necessary.  
 
2.3 Improvement needs 
In order to reduce significantly the software cost, the 
following have to be explored : 
• How to maximise generic features,  
• How to increase decoupling between the various 
functions, 
• How to improve reuse process and architecture, 
and provide the evidence of gains in terms of 
validation effort, 
• How to decrease cost of specific functions ? 
3. Expected benefits from the IMA concept 
Given the limitations outlined §2.2 and the 
improvement needs on the platform concept §2.3, 
space agencies are looking to what has been 
invested in the others domains for the development 
of embedded real-time software in order solve the 
same kind of questions. 
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It is to be noted that this paper focuses on the IMA 
concept rather than other initiatives such as 
AUTOSAR in the automotive world, because : 
• the constraints in terms of criticality aspects and 
associated rules have been seen very close 
from each other : DO178B software engineering 
and quality standard corresponds nearly one to 
one to space ECSS E40/Q80, 
• the notion of avionics and some associated 
functions are similar between an aircraft and a 
spacecraft, 
• the IMA concept has been seen as more mature 
because effectively implemented and flying 
today whereas AUTOSAR is still under 
development. 
 
It is not the objective of this paper to describe in 
details the IMA concept. However, an analysis of the 
main IMA offered features conducts to isolate the 
fundamental following aspects : 
• standard on-board computer resources including 
full CPU boards : processor, I/O, bus,… 
• standard certified RTOS and common API for all 
software functions (ARINC 653),  
• standard common software validation means. 
Both standard hardware and software implement 
time and space partitioning capabilities in order to 
guarantee the independency of the functions running 
on the same computer. 
The effectively observed benefits from this approach 
are : 
• develop once the standard features, 
• increase of reliability of the common complex 
generic software (and hardware) achieved 
throughout extensive testing, 
• embed software functions on the same computer 
having different criticality levels without risk of 
error propagation between functions, 
• embed software functions within the same 
computer without risk of error propagation 
between functions, 
• develop and validate functions incrementally and 
independently from the others, 
• optimise use of computer resources by late 
allocation of software functions to computers, 
As a matter of fact, in terms of organisational 
aspects, IMA concentrates the various competences 
on appropriate suppliers leading to an increase of 
the efficiency of the corresponding teams : 
• the function supplier can concentrate on the 
functional aspects without any particular 
knowledge of the hard-real time kernel, resource 
management, I/O, etc… 
• a change of function supplier would not affect 
the system level, 
• the IMA supplier can focus on the tricky real time 
concurrency problems (shared resources, 
tasking, scheduling) and develop those very 
critical software with dedicated process effort 
(including robustness). 
 
4. Why not IMA for space ? 
Without having full access today to the data and the 
convergence process that took place years ago 
inside the aeronautic community, it is very difficult to 
assess the validity of the IMA concept for the space 
needs. 
Nevertheless, the contacts initiated in the scope of 
preliminary studies and the help provided gently by 
the aeronautic people in order to explain the context 
and provide first answer to the raised questions, 
enabled to better characterise the differences 
between the two worlds and assess the validity of 
the approach step by step. 
A workshop was held in ESA on the topic beg. 
October 2007. It provided additional inputs in order 
to assess the IMA approach in space context to the 
preliminary already conducted studies on the 
subject. It was the forum for open discussions within 
the space community together with invited 
aeronautic people. 
 
The main differences between space and aeronautic 
have been isolated and classified into five 
categories: 
• technique 
• market 
• organisation 
• strategy 
• culture 
 
4.1 Technique 
 
Obviously the technical needs are not completely 
shared by the two domains : 
• time and space partitioning : it appears that 
aircrafts have to mix-up very critical functions 
(Cat A : flight control commands, braking, …) 
together with none critical ones (Cat E : flight 
entertainment). Satellites only on-board medium 
critical functions and almost of the same 
criticality level (Cat B-C). Another way saying all 
functions on-board the satellite are at-least 
mission-critical and therefore all developed 
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according the subsequent engineering and 
quality rules. 
• Standardisation : it is a clear objective shared by 
the two communities but there is still need for  
specific aspects. IMA is today “standard” within 
the same aircraft family (space platforms ?), but 
not compatible from an IMA supplier to an other. 
This means that it is not obvious whether it is 
affordable to standardise the envelope of needs 
in order to share the same computer resources 
and associated basic software for all satellites 
types.  
Moreover the consequences of such a concept 
would preclude the following : 
• Processors and computers : due to 
environmental constraints for space applications, 
it is not possible to fully reuse the hardware 
boards and processors developed by the 
aeronautic people. Dedicated and still very 
limited series of rad-hard processors are 
needed.  
• CPU and memory resources : today an ERC32 
is providing only 20 MIPS associated with a few 
Mbytes of memory. As a consequence the 
tendency in terms of avionics is more to 
decentralise and spread the processing into 
dedicated computers rather than concentrating 
within single units. The IMA would imply to have 
powerful processors enabling to support the IMA 
features (memory footprint, CPU overhead) and 
concentrate software functions. This problem will 
progressively disappear with the new 
generations of powerful european rad-hard 
processors (LEON, GINA, …). 
• Computer and bus architecture : the IMA 
concept has not only impact on software 
architectures. It relies also on a physical 
segregation of I/Os and memory not existing 
today in space avionics. 
• On-board software architecture : implementation 
of full ARINC 653 operating system induce a 
major impact on the current existing on-board 
software architectures and off-the-shelf building 
blocks. Applying such a design would mean a 
complete redesign and validation of them. 
• On-board software reliability : implementation of 
full ARINC 653 operating system induce a 
increased complexity : time and space 
partitioning features in the RTOS were difficult to 
develop, debug and maintain. Furthermore, the 
experience shows that validation of RTOS (ref. 
[3]) is very difficult, and today mainly rely on the 
validation achieved on the full software for the 
satellite software. This aspect has been properly 
tackled by the aeronautic people but remain a 
key issue where exchange of experience will be 
necessary. 
Technically, both developed IMA off-the-shelf 
hardware and software can not be directly reused 
without complete re-assessment of needs (possibly 
less stringent) and redesign in order to suit to 
technical existing rad-hard processors, computers, 
… 
 
4.2 Market – return on investment : 
Given the technical implication on the spacecraft 
avionics, it appears that the cost of IMA for space in 
terms of level of investment would be very high. This 
point is not disputed today by the aeronautic people. 
By lack of access to the confidential real figures, it is 
very difficult for the space community to estimate the 
cost of such an investment. Even if those figures 
were made available, transposition within the space 
context, 10 years later, would not be fully valid 
anyway. 
Macroscopic evaluation of both markets is however 
providing the following information : 
• Current aircrafts contain roughly one hundred 
computers and four hundred functions whereas 
satellites count at most twenty computers and a 
maximum of thirty functions. 
• In terms of series, an aircraft is supposed to be 
designed for more than one hundred items, 
whereas satellite platform count at most 10. 
In that context, it is not obvious that the gain on each 
computer development (hardware + software) would 
be sufficient except if maybe if the standardisation is 
achieved at the complete community level (between 
all agencies and all prime contractors). But as a 
matter of fact, is it technically realistic (and really 
desirable in particular in terms of risk) to achieve this 
harmonisation at the level of the space community, 
whereas the aeronautic people have one “IMA” per 
product line (which corresponds approximately to 
satellite platforms). 
In any case, redevelopment from scratch of an IMA-
like concept for space would not be affordable. 
 
4.3 Organisation 
In the aeronautic world, the IMA is supported by the 
aircraft manufacturer and contracted to one or 
several suppliers. 
Given the market constraints outlined §3.2, it would 
not be profitable for the satellite prime contractors to 
do the same (and already looking at the current 
situation achieved at platform level). Therefore IMA 
for space would imply to create an IMA design 
authority, and select supplier(s) at a consortium level 
(including agencies + prime contractors) based on a 
common investment. 
For the function supplier, the implication of IMA is 
also very important. The risk of such a rationalisation 
 Page 4/7 
at their level is to loose completely low level 
expertise on board computers and basic software.  
Furthermore, each function supplier need then to 
acquire IMA architecture background in order to 
provide software functions fully meeting the IMA 
constraints and development rules. 
The cost and impact in this area has to be properly 
mastered and challenged : the gain provided by IMA 
on the supplier has to be compared with the training 
effort and support from IMA supplier. 
The function supplier is also no longer providing fully 
integrated and validated packaged solutions 
(hardware + software). In terms of responsibility, the 
concept creates strong interactions between IMA, 
function suppliers and the system level : 
• In terms of schedule : IMA framework has to be 
made available to the function supplier, 
• In terms technical responsibilities, when an 
anomaly occurs in a function, the question may 
arise of whom is responsible and supposed to 
investigate, 
• Same question may appear at system 
integration level. 
Out the visibility we have today, the IMA aeronautic 
experience does not reveal problems in this area. 
But it seems that the IMA was much anticipated, and 
the level of accompanying effort was very high in 
order to prevent any schedule conflict : the technical 
segregation concept was fully validated before 
having made available to the suppliers. This is one 
of the major lessons learnt from their experience : it 
can not be implemented incrementally on projects 
and should be mature enough before being applied. 
 
4.4 Strategy 
The space community in Europe is organised very 
differently than in the aeronautic domain. The 
customers are mainly institutional, national agencies 
(CNES, DLR, ASI, BNSC…) and the ESA. All those 
actors have a strong interest in decreasing the cost 
of space missions, but without endangering their 
own national interests (which aim at maximising the 
implication of their industry on space programs). 
An harmonisation process is in place in order to 
make technical consistent decisions. But this 
process is very long and heavy even at least to 
converge and fund technical studies. One could 
imagine how long it could take to converge on a 
such a major issue. 
In the context of the aeronautic world, the IMA was 
pushed the airliners, which common interest was to 
decrease the cost of aircrafts. It was then declined 
by the aircraft manufacturers, and imposed to the 
suppliers. The decision making was somehow easier 
because it was a top-down process driven by 
economical interests regardless the implication on 
the suppliers (which market part remain quite 
comfortable at the end).  
In the space domain, they are few actors and it 
would be very dangerous to decide such a change 
without any preceding assessment of impact on all of 
them : it would be very dangerous (and not at all 
desirable) to stress any of the fragile suppliers with 
their associated know-how… 
 
3.5 Culture 
With this very complex network of actors, and 
possible reluctance of some of them for short term 
economical interests, and technical risks, the space 
community has to face also its history and culture. 
Space has been during tenth of years one of the 
leading engine producing brilliant and competing 
solutions at the time only technical objectives were 
assigned to projects without stress on economical 
constraints. 
Today, under more and more economical pressure, 
this community is reluctant to change things that 
have been investing stone after stone and which 
efficiency have been flight proven. It is clear also that 
again for economical short term constraints, both 
industry and agencies are not in favour of taking high 
risk and therefore do not push very hard for 
experiencing any major breakthrough. 
Last, and not specific to the space domain, 
engineers prefers slight innovations on what they 
know and master, rather than reusing existing 
concepts they have not invented nor experienced 
themselves : this “not-invented-here” syndrome is 
really preventing a proper cross-domain fertilisation 
and rationalisation. 
Was it easier in the aeronautic world to provoke such 
an earthquake ? Probably not, but the reality of the 
market and the very hard competition between 
aircraft manufacturers was a matter of survival. 
Today in the space business, at least for what 
concerns the institutional market in Europe, deciding 
IMA for space is not -at short term at least- a matter 
of life or death.   
5. IMA for space or something else ? 
For all the reasons depicted §3, IMA as such will not 
be applied and reused in the space domain. 
However something looking like IMA should emerge 
based on similar concepts but on an adapted  
technical rationale associated with a dedicated 
organisation and funding. 
In particular due to the culture and decision making 
process, a step by step approach will be preferred to 
any other violent breakthrough. 
 
5.1 consolidation of needs 
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There is a need for future missions : 
• to reuse software and invest on common core 
rather than developing several times the same 
pieces of software (IO, services, middleware…) 
• to on-board autonomy functions, less critical, 
and very difficult to validate. 
• within payload / instrument computers, the high 
critical FDIR shall coexist within the same 
computer with low critical data processing : the 
need is to develop the low critical functions with 
adapted engineering standards (and therefore 
accept less reliability). This approach is 
acceptable only if this does not endanger the 
high critical functions through segregation 
capabilities. 
• for maintenance in flight, to ease reloading of 
functions without reloading (and stopping) the 
full software. 
• for geo-return on European projects, it is needed 
to split the on-board software development on 
several function suppliers. The independence of 
the software development process between 
functions is necessary such a context. 
This preliminary list of needs should be properly 
refined, and classified from top basic mandatory 
needs down to optional desirable ones : this would 
drive the roadmap for incremental step by step 
implementation and deployment of the concept. 
 
5.2 challenge of technical solutions and impacts 
• As a prerequisite focus first on standardisation of 
software engineering (E40, Q80) architectures 
and interfaces (SOIS, PUS). 
• Impact on hardware side (including resources 
aspects) shall be assessed carefully because it 
seems that the expected benefits will be very 
limited if MMU as well I/O are not physically 
segregated. Cache/registers flushing at each 
partition switch will cost on the software 
performance. Injection of constraints in the 
hardware roadmap. 
• Definition of the appropriate robustness level : 
select the capabilities to be implemented in the 
RTOS (dynamical checks, physical barriers), in 
the associated tools (static software checks at 
compilation step). 
• Definition of the appropriate genericity level : It is 
to better to customise optimised solutions 
according to family of applications instead of 
fully generic inducing complexity in particular in 
the configuration process. 
• Compare with other experienced approaches 
providing also segregation capabilities such as 
ASSERT, CORDET, DISCO, CNES TMSCM… 
Many studies have been initiated already in order to 
consolidate the implications and prototype solutions 
to be experienced on the space use cases : 
• Impact on RTEMS will be assessed (CNES + 
ESA studies), because RTEMS is spread on the 
space applications and per essence, the impact 
on the existing reused software would be 
minimised and possibly smoother than with other 
RTOS. Nevertheless the other RTOS will be 
evaluated in the scope of the CNES study. 
• Real implementation is to be evaluated for 
SYMBOL-X payload function. CNES, in charge 
of this software will inject dedicated 
requirements in this area. 
Those studies have to be structured and 
complemented by others in order to secure all the 
technical issues before any decisions. A dedicated 
roadmap has to be written in order to address all of 
them. 
 
5.3 organisational  
In parallel to the technical studies, some analysis 
shall be conducted in order to identify by whom and 
how IMA for space should be managed and 
decisions taken. 
The business model has to be carefully assessed 
and defined by all the actors, in a wider context 
where an organisational model is already under 
discussion on the way to develop and share software 
building blocks. 
• The agencies should clearly identify the targeted 
needs and found a funding scheme of all the 
preliminary assessment studies. 
• The technical design authority board should be 
created in order to define and agree on targeted 
“reasonable” and “incremental” level of 
specifications (to be standardised within the 
appropriate ECSS place-holder). 
• Both agencies, prime contractors and software 
suppliers should identify the investment they are 
ready to perform. This should be consolidated in 
order to show how the resulting project costs 
would decrease. 
6. Key dates and short term roadmap 
Trying to draw where IMA for space stands today, 
lead to the following key dates and events already 
held : 
• 2006 : preliminary tentative studies initiated by 
ESA (TRP + GSTP). Only technical activities 
started on ARINC 653 and on-board software 
impacts. 
• June 2007 : CNES presents the paper “IMA for 
space : status and perspectives” [1] in the scope 
of CISEC day on IMA. The status was difficult to 
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depict due to a very large number of questions 
and lack of knowledge on the concept and the 
way it was implemented. 
• End September : IMA day in the scope of 
ADCSS workshop in ESTEC/ESA the Nederland 
where the results of preliminary studies were 
presented. After the roundtable, a preliminary 
roadmap was established and reflected here in 
this paper. 
And at very short term : 
• January 2008 : key meeting to be held between 
ESA, CNES and prime contractors (TAS, 
ASTRIUM) in order to define the scope of a 
structuring study involving all the parties and 
covering all major issues. 
• End 2008 (hopefully) : the roadmap will be 
consolidated together will risk, cost and 
organisational analysis. Would the consortium 
be then in position to create the IMA for space 
project ? 
 
7. Conclusion 
IMA concept will not be reused as such by the space 
community because it does suit to the needs, the 
constraints (technical, organisational, costs, risks…). 
Nevertheless most of the ideas behind the IMA 
concept are valid and the experience gained in the 
aeronautic field is very profitable in order to 
capitalise the lessons learnt and decline for space 
the key drivers of what would be or should be 
invested instead (and as a consequence save time 
and money). 
Already preliminary activities have been conducted 
and will be structured efficiently with an associated 
roadmap in 2008. 
A clear and unambiguous signal has still to be given 
by all the contributing actors of the space domain in 
order to confirm the future of IMA for space.  
Would OpenSpace project be launched in 2008 ? 
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